






























UDK  35.07(493.3/4 
Pregledni znanstveni rad / review scientific paper
Primljeno / received:  6.  6. 2011.
Prihvaćeno / accepted: 15. 11. 2011.
The Belgian constitution states that ‘Belgium is a federal 
state, composed of communities and regions’. This is the 
result of five state reforms (1970, 1980, 1988/1989, 1993 
and 2001). The political power of the country is divided 
among different partners: communities, regions and the 
federal state. The position of the nation-state has weake-
ned as authority has been transferred downwards, to the 
regional level, and upwards, to the European Union. The 
five successive state reforms of the past have not yet resul-
ted in a final satisfactory state architecture – the debates 
about the future form of the country are at the core of the 
political agenda in Belgium. The Flemish and the French - 
-speaking communities have different opinions about how 
to organize the country. The history of state reform process 
has been analyzed briefly in the first part of this paper. 
The process of state reform also had consequences for the 
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local authorities. Since 2001, the regions (Flanders and 
the Walloon Region) have been responsible for the orga-
nisation of local and provincial government. This resulted 
in a new framework for both of the local governments, in 
Flanders and in the Walloon Region. In Flanders, the dis-
cussion about the (re)organisation of the local level has 
continued until today. The Flemish government that came 
into power in 2009 is considering a shift of competences 
between the different government levels, a reform of mu-
nicipal finances and the promotion of voluntary mergers 
between municipalities. Those initiatives are analysed and 
placed into a broader perspective. The analysis takes into 
account the questions of what the Flemish government is 
aiming at and why.
Key words: Flemish state reform, local, provincial and re-
gional self-government – Belgium, Belgian federalism, the 
Brussels-Capital Region, Flanders, the Walloon Region, 
amalgamations and mergers, linguistic divide
1. Introduction
Belgium was established in 1830, as a unitary country. It was a parlia-
mentary monarchy where real political power was located in the hands 
of the central government. This situation remained unchanged until the 
beginning of the 1970s. Since then, five successive institutional state re-
forms have transformed the country into a federal state consisting of com-
munities, regions and the central government. The first ideas about this 
transformation actually date back to the foundation of the country. The 
choice of the French language as the official language of Belgium was an 
obvious choice for the political elites. However, the majority of the popu-
lation was Dutch-speaking (Deschouwer, 2009: 26–30). This linguistic di-
vide had always formed a latent tension in Belgian politics, but it became 
a real issue since the 1960s.
Provinces and municipalities have always been administrative tiers of the 
country. Since the beginning, they have both had their own responsibili-
ties and tasks, but have also been under tight grip of financial and legal 
restrictions. Next to that, many forms of intergovernmental and intermu-
nicipal cooperation have come to light, especially in the last two decades. 
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Finally, the rise of the European Union in the recent decades has implied 
an additional shift of power towards this supra state level.
Since 2001, the regions (Flanders and the Walloon Region) have been 
responsible for the organisation of local and provincial government. This 
resulted in a new framework for both the local governments in Flanders 
(Gemeentedecreet) and in the Walloon Region (Code de la démocratie locale 
et de la décentralisation). Both the operating modes of the municipal and 
provincial bodies and their day-to-day administration have been reformed 
by these new legal frameworks.
In Flanders, the discussion about the (re-)organisation of local government 
has continued until today. The relation between the local and the regional 
level is a point of particular interest. The new Flemish government, which 
came into power in 2009, announced that it would carry out an ‘internal 
Flemish state reform’. Thereby the government considered – among other 
things – a shift of competences between the different government levels, a 
reform of the municipal finances and the promotion of voluntary mergers 
between municipalities with a financial bonus (Bourgeois, 2010).
We intend to take a closer look at those initiatives and place them into 
a broader perspective. What is the Flemish government aiming at and 
why? The proposed reforms seem to stress the importance of the local 
level which the Flemish government wants to strengthen. The meso-level 
(the provincial level) and the many structures between the local and the 
provincial level will possibly pay a price for that. The provinces will receive 
a closed list of territory-related competences regarding economy, envi-
ronment, agriculture etc. Person-related competences such as education, 
welfare, culture, youth and sport will be transferred to the municipal or 
regional level (Valcke, Reynaert & Steyvers, 2011). Moreover, the empha-
sis clearly lies on a more efficient government. Democratic reforms seem 
to trigger far less attention.
In the first part of this article we will briefly focus on the Belgian federa-
lism. Before answering the above formulated questions, it is necessary to 
give a short overview of the successive state reforms and to explain how 
the Belgian state structure functions. Afterwards we will focus our atten-
tion towards the Flemish part of the country by an outline of the debate 
about the internal Flemish state reform.
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2. State Reform in Belgium. A Continuing Story?
2.1. Belgian Federalism in a Nutshell
Belgium was created in 1830 by the former European powers of that time. 
The building blocks of the country (Flanders and Wallonia) were new en-
tities that came into being as a result of this creation (Deschouwer, 2009: 
42–46; Swenden & Jans, 2009). Flanders has a long history, but that is 
the history of the County of Flanders, whose territory was limited to the 
current provinces of East and West Flanders. Today, parts of this historic 
County belong to the Netherlands and parts to France. The provinces of 
Limburg, Antwerp and Brabant were added to Flanders. The same is true 
of Wallonia. Before 1830, there had never been a well-defined entity with 
that name or boundaries. As a result, Belgium was not built on historic 
communities. The country was built on new entities, both defined by the 
use of language. The northern part (Flanders) is Dutch-speaking and the 
southern part (Wallonia) is French-speaking. The capital Brussels is bilin-
gual, but the French language dominates.
Through the years different opinions about the future of Belgium grew 
on both sides of this language border. The Dutch-speaking part of the 
country – in spite of the fact that they form a majority in Belgium – felt 
that the Flemish community was badly treated by the Belgian state. It 
claimed full recognition of Dutch as an official language in Belgium. For 
this recognition (and protection) the Flemish community wanted to rece-
ive autonomy (for instance in matters such as culture) within well-defined 
boundaries. The French-speaking part of the country was not in favour of 
fixing this language border. They defended the individual right to speak 
the language of one’s choice. In reality, the French language did not need 
to be protected, since, especially in the Brussels Region, the language was 
used with increased frequency, a process also known as ‘frenchification’. 
Historically, Brussels was Dutch-speaking, but the city and its surroun-
dings now have a population a very large majority of which (80%) speaks 
French.
After the Second World War, the notion of federalism was put onto the 
political agenda by the regionalist parties in Flanders. Soon, that example 
was followed in Brussels and Wallonia. It referred to the decentralization 
of the unitary Belgian state into entities defined by the use of language. 
As a result, the country was transformed into the current federal country. 
As Deschouwer has pointed out, the Belgian state reform was not the rea-
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lization of a blueprint. It was a step-by-step process by which each reform 
built further on the previous one.
The first important step was taken in 1963 when the language border was 
frozen (Deschouwer, 2009: 46–54). This agreement fulfilled a number of 
important Flemish requests. Both the geographical limitation of Brussels 
and the freezing of the language border were clear victories for Flanders. 
The first constitutional reform took place in 1970. It was the most im-
portant step towards a federal country. This reform set up the regions 
and the communities. It was unclear what their competences would be, 
but the fact that they existed was important. Since then on, Belgium has 
consisted of three regions (Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels) that followed 
a territorial logic. Next to them, there came three communities, the Dut-
ch-speaking, the French-speaking and the German-speaking community 
(which is territorially rooted in the Walloon area). The regions were reque-
sted by the French-speaking part of the country, since Wallonia wanted to 
conduct its own economic policy to tackle the difficult economic situation 
in the south of the country. The communities offered an answer to an 
old Flemish request to conduct their own cultural policy. Both the Fren-
ch- and the Dutch-speaking communities overlap in the Brussels Region 
(Appendix 1).
A second important step was taken in 1980 with a second amendment to 
the constitution. Both the regions and the communities were granted a 
parliamentary assembly, not directly elected at that time. Both the regions 
and the communities also got a government, called ‘executive’.1 The third 
step, a solution for Brussels, was reached by the end of the 1980s. The 
Brussels Region got a directly elected parliament and its own government. 
The parliament was divided into two language groups and the Brussels 
government was composed of an equal number of Dutch- and French-
speaking ministers. In 1989, the first direct election of the Brussels parli-
ament took place.
A fourth important phase of the Belgian state reform was reached in 
1993. Direct election of all the regional parliaments was implemented. 
Both the regions and the communities were granted additional compe-
tences and financial means, which further strengthened their position in 
the Belgian state structure. The latest round of state reform was reached 
in 2001. Compared to the previous phases, it was of minor importance. 
1  In Flanders, the parliament and the executive hold the powers of both the region 
and the community.
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Both the regions and the communities were granted wider financial and 
fiscal autonomy. However, it is worth mentioning that since that agree-
ment, the three regions in Belgium have been fully competent for organi-
zing and supervising the provinces and the municipalities. Both Flanders 
and Wallonia have since then made use of this competence by stipulating 
new rules for the local and provincial levels. Until know, the Brussels-
Capital Region has not yet used this new competence, which means that 
the municipalities in the Brussels Region still function according to the 
Belgian legislation (Wayenberg & De Rynck, 2008).
2.2. The Present State Structure of Belgium
As a result of these five rounds of state reform, the regions and the com-
munities are responsible for a considerable list of competences (Descho-
uwer, 2009: 54–57; Hoorens, 2008: 179–180). In short, the regions are in 
charge of matters related to territory, while the communities are in charge 
of matters related to people.2 This distinction is sometimes problematic 
and it is not always very clear, since many competences somehow refer to 
both the territory and the people. Nevertheless, it was used as a guideline 
during the process of state reform in Belgium. The regions are today res-
ponsible for matters such as agriculture, housing, water policy, economy, 
transport, local and provincial authorities. The communities, on the other 
hand, deal with matters such as culture, education, language, and health. 
Finally, the federal government does not have a closed list of competen-
ces, which makes it responsible for all the residual matters. The most im-
portant of them are justice, social security, defence and foreign affairs.
At the sub-national level, Belgium has ten provinces, equally divided 
between both regions (five in Flanders and five in Wallonia). The provin-
ces are (today) responsible for a relatively extensive range of fields (Hoo-
rens, 2008: 180–181). Some examples are education, social and cultural 
infrastructure, social policy, environment, waterways, economy, housing, 
etc. Finally, there are 589 municipalities in Belgium; 308 of them are 
situated in Flanders, 262 in Wallonia (including 9 German-speaking mu-
nicipalities) and the Brussels-Capital Region has 19 municipalities. The 
municipalities are responsible for matters delegated to them by the hi-
gher state levels and for all matters with a municipal interest. In this way, 
2  The central state holds person-related competences, such as the social security 
system.
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the local authorities have an extensive (open) list of competences such as 
town planning, education, culture and sports (museums, infrastructure), 
environmental issues, infrastructure (roads), tourism, health, social wel-
fare, etc. 
3. In the Meantime in Flanders ... 
As mentioned earlier, during the latest round of state reform in Belgium 
(2001) the basic laws regulating the political and administrative functio-
ning of local and provincial governments were transferred from the federal 
to the regional level. As a result, the Brussels Region, Wallonia and Flan-
ders can decide on their own how to organize local government in their 
respective regions. In the following chapter, we will analyze the way in 
which the Flemish Region has dealt with this opportunity and how Flan-
ders has redrawn the lines for local and provincial government.
3.1. Search for New (Flemish) Legislation
In early 2001, when the Flemish government obtained the competence to 
regulate the political and administrative functioning of the provinces and 
the municipalities, it announced that it would start a debate about the 
future role of the three (regional, provincial and local) government levels 
in Flanders (Devos & Reynaert, 2002). Two questions were central in 
this debate: (1) what is (still) of public interest and (2) what are the core 
competences of each government level? It soon became clear that only 
the second question would be addressed. The debate, which took pla-
ce between 2001 and 2003, resulted in an agreement between the three 
directly elected government levels and in the outline of a profile of each 
one of them. As the principle of subsidiarity was the central guideline 
during this debate, the municipalities were confirmed as the basic level of 
democracy and the first line of government. While the task of the Flemish 
government was seen as central steering and controlling, the provinces 
were seen as a compromise scale, democratically legitimizing policy in the 
grey zone between the other government levels. At the supra-local level, 
the provinces had a role of mediators for policy problems at the meso 
level. In practice, however, this role was in collision because of the coo-
peration structures that municipalities and the Flemish government had 
already set in place at the very same level (intermunicipal cooperation and 
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Flemish agencies). The general agreement of 2003 had never been carried 
out, but some arrangements found their way in practice afterwards (De 
Ceuninck & Valcke, 2007).
In 2005, the Flemish Parliament approved the decree that created a new 
juridical framework, introducing quite a few administrative and political 
reforms (Municipal Decree, July 2005; Suykens, 2006). In the first ca-
tegory, the decree introduced a list of instruments to conduct a more 
efficient and effective local policy. Some elements of the new public ma-
nagement were introduced to the local level in Flanders. There were cer-
tain provisions that strengthened the role of staff members, financially, 
for instance. They can decide autonomously on certain budgets that are 
in their competence. One of the main political reforms is related to the 
strengthening of local council. The mayor is no longer president of the 
council, since the latter can now elect a president among its members. On 
top of that, the council received new instruments to control the college of 
mayor and aldermen.
3.2. From Green Paper to White Paper
After the regional elections of 2009 it became clear that the Flemish go-
vernment had (again) great plans for the local government level. The co-
alition agreement between the Christian-democratic (CD&V), Socialist 
(sp.a) and Flemish nationalist (N-VA) parties revealed several elements of 
an upcoming reform (Vlaamse Regering, 2009). Generally, a distinction is 
made between political and administrative reforms. Whereas the former 
seek to improve the quality of local democracy, the latter primarily focus 
on establishing a (more) efficient local government. At the moment, the 
emphasis in the plan of the Flemish government clearly lies on the second 
option, the administrative reforms.
This is highlighted by the central aim of the plan to simplify the inter-
nal state structure of Flanders (Bourgeois, 2010: 19–32). The Flemish 
go vern ment wants to downsize what is called ‘the crowded government 
house’. In the previous few decades, too many new structures and orga-
nizations were established. Each of them has its own competences, its 
financial resources and its decision-making procedures. Many of these 
institutions have been established as joint organisations of the municipali-
ties and the provinces. They make the institutional landscape too complex 
and therefore the Flemish government wants that in the future, no more 
than two government levels are responsible for a specific competence. To 
1025
K. de Ceuninck, H. Reynaert: Flanders Heading Towards Its Own State Reform


























realize this, an internal state reform is necessary, by which the competen-
ces and financial resources linked to them will potentially move from one 
government level to another. Moreover, the regional government intends 
to modify the financing of municipalities, to diminish the numerous plan-
ning obligations and even to diminish the number of municipalities. They 
hope a financial encouragement will set off voluntary amalgamations 
(Bour geois, 2011: 51–52). 
The willingness to simplify the government structure implies that the Fle-
mish government chooses to reinforce the municipalities. The coalition 
agreement states: »The emphasis lies with the municipalities on the one 
hand and Flanders on the other hand. Simplifying the intervening govern-
ment levels is necessary to come to a more efficient and effective govern-
ment as a whole«. The intermediate government level (provinces, inter-
municipal cooperation via ‘intercommunales’ and devolutive government 
forms such as agencies) will be screened and – if and where possible – 
simplified or even abolished. It is not quite clear what this means for the 
provincial government level. At least there is an intention to make the pro-
vinces responsible for a limited (and closed) list of competences that are 
ground-tied (economy, agriculture, environment, spatial planning) and to 
exclude all competences that are person-tied (culture, youth, sports).
3.3.  Less Is More ... towards Amalgamations  
of Municipalities?
It is clear that the Flemish government has opted for stronger local 
govern ments. The Flemish local governments are defined (in the policy 
declaration of the Minister) as the level of government ‘closest to the 
citizens’ and the ‘first contact with the government’ for citizens. »The mu-
nicipality is the basic link in the Flemish government. For this reason, 
Flanders needs strong and powerful local governments«. In that context, 
the Flemish government wants to reach and implement a simplification 
of its administrative landscape in which the local government level must 
play a prominent role. Municipal amalgamations are one way of reaching 
this goal.
Municipal amalgamations are nothing new in European context. Both 
in the 1960s and 1970s different European countries implemented some 
form of amalgamation policies (Baldersheim & Rose, 2010: 2–7). Some 
European countries have also been confronted with amalgamations for 
the last 15 years. The motives for these reforms are very diverse. Skabur-
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skis has made up an inventory of goals and motives for boundary reforms 
of which political, functionalist, and administrative goals are the most im-
portant (Skaburskis, 2004: 49–51). In the last category, we find elements 
such as financial independence of local units and power-to-govern objecti-
ves. A functionalist goal can be to capture the economies of scale. Finally, 
a good example of a political objective is the reinforcement of local power, 
particularly to make local politicians responsible for their own decisions. 
Swianiewicz has also listed up the motives behind territorial reforms (Swi-
aniewicz, 2010: 1–23). The most important elements he has found are the 
economies of scale, the increased capacity to provide a wider range of fun-
ctions, the increased participation in local politics (since local government 
has more to decide upon), the increased possibilities of strategic planning 
and economic development, etc. Of course, there are also elements that 
hinder such reforms. The accessibility of local administration can become 
a problem as the distance between citizens and the town hall increases. As 
a consequence, the local identity of communities may disappear. There is 
also the fear of not being represented any more especially in small villages. 
Local communities are sometimes afraid that their voice will be disregar-
ded in the distant municipal centre. Last but not least, there is political 
resistance against territorial reforms. Merged municipalities always mean 
a reduction of political mandates. It can mean that local politicians not 
only lose their jobs, but also the prestige that comes with it.
Belgium faced several amalgamations in the 1960s and 1970s (De Ce-
uninck, 2009). In the 1960s the amalgamations remained limited. The 
operation of 1976, however, reduced the total number of Belgian mu-
nicipalities from 2,359 to 589. The average number of inhabitants per 
municipality increased from about 4,000 to more than 16,000. According 
to the Belgian government this operation was necessary to make the mu-
nicipalities financially healthy again. Next to that, they would allow the 
municipalities to attract sufficient and better-trained staff and they would 
end the high political fragmentation at the local level. Amalgamations co-
uld also make an end to the many forms of intermunicipal cooperation. In 
this way they could contribute to a more transparent local administrative 
landscape.
A lot of resistance was raised against this operation. However, this was 
not resistance against the principle of this operation; rather it was poin-
ted against the way the reform was carried out. The decision-making at 
that time was very much top-down. The majority parties (the Christian 
democratic CVP and the liberal PVV) drew the new municipal borders. 
The opposition parties played no role at all. Furthermore, the municipa-
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lities themselves hardly played any role, although they were the objects 
of the reform3. The municipalities could only give advice on the proposal 
of amalgamation that came from the Minister of Internal Affairs Michel, 
who was responsible for the implementation of this operation. Because 
such a huge reform was carried out in this manner, municipal amalgama-
tions have been highly controversial in Belgium ever since. One can even 
speak of a taboo. It is clear from the table below that the total number of 
municipalities in Belgium remained unchanged since 1983.
Table 1 Total number of municipalities in Belgium at different stages of 
development
Year Flanders Wallonia Brussels







1960 1,124 1,520 19 2,663
1972 906 1,434 19 2,359 4,136
1977 315 262 19 596 16,565
1983 308 262 19 589 16,731
1830: Belgian independence; 1928: highest total number of municipalities ever in Belgium; 
1960: start of the first amalgamations; 1972: on the eve of the ‘grand reform’ operation; 1977: 
after the ‘grand reform’ of 1976; 1983: after the amalgamation in the city of Antwerp.
Thus, it is striking to see that the Flemish government has chosen new 
amalgamations to increase the strength of its municipalities. However, 
the Minister recognises that most of the Flemish municipalities have a 
3  Note that Belgium ratified the European Charter of Local Self-Government in 
2004. Article 5 of this Charter states that ‘Changes in local authority boundaries shall not be 
made without prior consultation of the local communities concerned, possibly by means of 
a referendum where this is permitted by statute’. 
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sufficient scale and therefore have no need for an amalgamation. »Never-
theless there are still a large number of municipalities that are too small. 
According to Minister Bourgeois, several forums, including scientific 
ones, plead for new mergers« (Bourgeois, 2010).
The Flemish municipal decree of 2005 already made possible voluntary 
mergers between municipalities. Until today, no municipality has used 
that possibility. A new element, however, is that the Flemish government 
wants to give financial stimuli (restricted in time) to municipalities that 
want to merge. The government wants to give the merged municipalities 
extra financial resources from the municipal fund, for the first six years 
(or one term of office) after the merger (Bourgeois, 2011: 51–52). The 
share that the new municipality receives after the amalgamation should 
be higher than the sum of what the former municipalities received indi-
vidually. The Flemish government wishes to provide legal and administra-
tive support to the municipalities that consider an amalgamation. The 
Department of Internal Affairs, under the supervision of Minister Bour-
geois, is responsible for this. The Minister intends to set up an ‘amalga-
mation team’ whose task will be to support the municipalities as much as 
possible, both legally and organisationally. Such a team should assist the 
municipalities as much as possible in the process of amalgamation.
The first reaction of the Association of Flemish Municipalities (VVSG) 
has been rather reserved. Without disapproving the principle, the organi-
sation has pointed out that there is hardly any support for this idea among 
the local councils. The director of the VVSG, Mark Suykens, has put it as 
follows, »Amalgamations, too, are a possible way to strengthen local au-
thorities. But merging extended, rural municipalities with low tax incomes 
doesn’t automatically lead to strong municipalities« (Van Moerkerke, 
2010). With this point of view, the VVSG has recognised that amalgama-
tions are a part of the solution, but are certainly not deus ex machina that 
will solve all the problems.
For the moment, it is unclear whether many municipalities will use the 
possibilities offered by the Flemish government. The enthusiasm for 
amalgamations is traditionally rather limited in Flanders, due to the fac-
tors mentioned above. Amalgamations can be a sound instrument for rais-
ing the strength of municipalities. In Belgium, the reform attempts in the 
1970s showed this clearly. However, it is not a solution to all the prob-
lems municipalities have. When several rural municipalities (with a lack of 
power to govern) are merged, the result is not automatically a very strong 
municipality. The problems the municipalities have faced with are only 
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moved to a larger scale. Thus, it is maybe even more important to work on 
a sound financing plan for the local level government.
3.4. The Financing of Municipalities
The financing of the Flemish municipalities remains a difficult discus-
sion. At the beginning of this legislative period (in 2007), the economic 
situation did not seem too bad. From a study of Dexia Bank, the house 
banker of the Belgian local governments, it became clear that the mac-
roeconomic expectations for the coming years were very good (Dexia, 
2007). To quote study, »The Federal Planning Bureau expects a return of 
the economic activity, which can lean very close to the potential growth in 
the Eurozone. In the course of 2006–2012, the GDP of the Eurozone can 
grow on average at 1.8% per year«. Nevertheless, the same study already 
warned about certain potential dangers. These prophetical words were, 
»The most important risk is the unbalanced macroeconomic situation in 
the US and the geopolitical uncertainty. Much depends on the cooling 
down of the US-economy«. In the meantime, we have known better. The 
financial crisis at the end of 2008, followed by an economic crisis, resulted 
in a worldwide decrease of the economic growth, rising unemployment, 
decreasing government income and rising expenditures for governments 
(social security). In Flanders, both the provinces and the municipalities 
felt the impact of this economic decline.
The Flemish municipalities have financial autonomy, anchored in the 
Belgian constitution (Articles 170 and 173). In that sense, they can tax 
anything they want, as long as the local councils agree with the tax. The 
revenues of the Flemish local governments can be split up into three cate-
gories. The first category includes the taxes and makes up about 50.8 
per cent of the total revenues (2009) (Dexia, 2010). The second category 
includes the income from subsidies and funds, 35.8 per cent of the total 
reve nues. The majority of this income originates from the higher govern-
ment levels (the Flemish government and the federal government). The 
third and last category includes the income from municipal resources 
(turnovers from municipal activities or municipal capital) and in 2009, 
these had the share of 13.4 per cent of all revenues.
The expenditures can also be divided into three categories. The first cate-
gory includes all expenditures for staff and functioning costs. In 2010, 
this category amounted to 57.4 per cent of the total expenditures in the 
Flemish municipalities. A second category is formed by the transfers, and 
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amounted to 30.6 per cent. This category consists of transfers from local 
governments to different other institutions, such as the local police force, 
public welfare centres, hospitals, etc. The third and last category consists 
of the debt expenditures, particularly the payment of loans. This category 
has a share of 12 per cent of all local expenditures.
However, the financial weight of the local governments in Belgium must 
be nuanced. The local level (municipalities and provinces together) had a 
share of only 7.1 per cent of the Belgian GNP in 2010, whereas the aver-
age in the European Union was 12.1 per cent in the same year (Eurostat).4 
In the Netherlands, for example, this figure is almost 17.3 per cent. Such 
small weight of the local governments in Belgium can partly be explained 
by the federal structure of the country, in which the regions take a large 
part of the total expenditures at local governments’ expense.
In 2008, the local level faced with rising inflation (Dexia, 2009). The total 
cost for personnel, which generally amounts to 40 to 50 per cent of the lo-
cal budgets, increased rapidly because of this.5 Furthermore, the transfers 
from the municipalities to the public welfare centres and the local police 
force increased seriously because of the higher remunerations that had 
to be paid. A sharp rise of energy prices had a heavy impact on the local 
finances. On the revenue side, local governments felt the impact of the 
economic crisis with some delay. Here, too, the municipalities were con-
fronted with smaller revenues due to the crisis. Such a difficult financial 
situation is particularly inconvenient for the local level. The current local 
legislative period (2006-2012) started with some important financial chal-
lenges for the municipalities. Some of these challenges, which will require 
important financial efforts from the local level in the near future, are ad-
dressed in the following paragraphs.
Firstly, there are the pensions of the civil servants (Dexia, 2007). The fact 
that there is a strong increase in the number of contractual staff members 
and the fact that the ‘RSZPPO’ (the organisation that regulates the pen-
sions of the local and provincial civil servants in Belgium) is running out of 
its reserves, make the pension problem relevant. Moreover, in 2008, the 
government decided to set up a second pension pillar for the contractual 
staff of the local governments. The local level must urgently search for ad-
ditional financial resources for these pending expenses. 
4  This figure is the average of 27 EU member states (Eurostat, 2011).
5  In 2008, the index (of remunerations) of the public sector was exceeded no less 
than three times.
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Unlike the first example, which concerns all Belgian municipalities, the 
second example is especially important for the larger municipalities with 
substantial area. As a result of the EU Water Framework Directive of 22 
December 2000, all municipalities in the European Union are obliged to 
obtain a good quality of inland surface water, transitional water, coastal 
water and groundwater before 2015. This EU’s decision has a far-reaching 
impact on the transport and purification of water. The first aspect (trans-
port) is a municipal competence whereas the second (purification) is a 
competence of the intermediate level. To meet the European standards, 
all polluted water must be purified in purification installations by the end 
of 2012. It is clear that all municipalities, and certainly those with larger 
land area, will have serious financial costs. New sewerage systems will 
have to be covered with heavy investment. Although to reach that goal 
municipalities can count on substantial subsidies of the Flemish Environ-
ment Agency (VMM), a large share still remains to be paid by the local 
units.6
Further financial challenges are – among others – formed by the reform 
of fire departments (larger zones) and the reform of financing of the local 
police zones. In both important cases, there is fear that the (rising) costs 
will be pushed towards the municipalities. It is clear that local govern-
ments in Flanders are faced with several important (financial) challenges 
with far-reaching consequences for their budgets.
Thus, the local finances in Flanders are under pressure from two sides. On 
the one hand, the municipalities are faced with decreasing income as a re-
sult of the economic crisis. On the other hand, they are faced with several 
important additional costs. The Minister of Internal Affairs is aware of 
this difficult financial situation. In his policy declaration, he has written, 
»I am aware of the high pressure on the local finances today, because of 
many new challenges in difficult economic circumstances. In that context 
... I will search for possibilities to use the available (Flemish) budget for 
the municipalities as efficiently as possible« (Bourgeois, 2009: 33–36). 
One of the possibilities put forward by the Minister is the reform of the 
municipal fund. The municipal fund (which counts for about 20 per cent 
of all local revenues) has an annual growth rate of 3.5 per cent. This, how-
ever, remains insufficient. Two important elements in the debate on that 
6  The municipalities generally only receive funds to rebuild the sewerage system, but 
the rebuilding of the roads afterwards is a cost for the local level.
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reform are the total amount of this fund and the distribution of money 
among the different municipalities.
In his policy declaration, the Minister has given an overview of the 
concrete interpretation of his proposals. Firstly, he wants to abolish all 
‘coupled’ subsidies. The phenomenon of coupled subsidies occurs when 
municipalities or provinces are obliged to spend money as a result of a de-
cision of the Flemish government. This principle does not fit with the idea 
that each government level should take financial responsibility for its own 
decisions. Secondly, the Minister wants the municipal fund to grow con-
tinually during his term of office (until 2014). Furthermore, the Minister 
wants to reform the allocation formula that is considered to be far too 
complex at the moment. According to the Minister, the new formula must 
contain only a limited number of parameters. In the first place he thinks 
of a basic financing for all municipalities. A second element must be a 
fair redistribution between strong and weaker municipalities7. Finally, a 
third element wants to support municipalities that meet certain standards 
of quality. It is the intention of the Minister to reward the municipalities 
that achieve a certain degree of efficiency and good governance.
The manner in which the Minister intends to work out all his proposals is 
unclear. When exactly is one municipality stronger than the other? When 
does it need additional financial support? It is difficult to give a definition 
of a strong municipality (HRBB, 2002). ‘Power to govern’ is a contingent 
term for which there is no uniform definition. ‘The power to govern’ is 
usually defined as »the capacity of a municipality to be responsive, to be 
able to do what it has to do«. However, such a definition does not explain 
why one municipality is stronger than the other. Moreover, the power to 
govern seems to vary strongly depending on the policy domain and the 
competences we speak of. The proposal to give extra financial support 
to those municipalities that meet certain ‘standards of quality’ remains 
vague. It is an open issue what these standards will be and in what way 
they will be applied.
In the meantime, the Minister has decided that the announced reform 
of the municipal fund will no longer be implemented during this Flem-
ish legislative period. The Minister knows that this reform is impossible 
without additional financial resources, on top of the annual growth rate of 
3.5 per cent. Without these additional resources, there is a risk that some 
7  A strong municipality is defined as a municipality with many local tax possibilities 
(high number of inhabitants, presence of local industry, etc.). 
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municipalities will loose resources from the fund, which is politically unre-
alistic. For the moment, those extra financial resources are not available, 
due to the consequences of the economic crisis. The Minister wants to re-
alise this reform during his term of office. The implementation, however, 
will have to wait till the next legislative period, sometime in 2015.
3.5. And the Provincial Level?
Five Flemish provinces are generally classified as local government, toge-
ther with 308 municipalities (De Ceuninck, Reynaert & Valcke, 2011). 
This implies that the principle elements from the coalition agreement (of 
July 2009) regarding the intermediate government level are closely linked 
to the policy priorities regarding the municipalities. It is our intention to 
comment on some of these objectives with regard to the provincial level.
Strong municipalities are at the heart of the internal state reform, as 
described in the Flemish coalition agreement. »The intention is to bring 
government closer to citizens. (...) The emphasis lies on the municipa-
lities on the one hand, and Flanders on the other hand«. How did the 
intermediate government level react to this intention? The chairman of 
the Association of Flemish Provinces (VVP) welcomed the internal state 
reform but stipulated that »the Flemish coalition agreement was all too 
eager to plan the state reform at the expense of the provincial government 
level« (Geuens, 2009). The VVP stresses the principle of partnership that 
seems to be one of the guidelines of the Flemish coalition agreement and 
points out that all three democratically elected government levels must 
have the courage to engage themselves on an equal basis. Moreover, they 
continue, »we are not afraid to evaluate the functioning of the intermedi-
ate government level, if the Flemish regional and local government levels 
are prepared to asses and possibly refocus their functioning«. It is obvious 
that the proponents of the provincial level are quite aware of the possible 
negative impact of the state reform.
The provincial government level has mixed feelings in the run-up to the 
internal state reform (Geuens, 2009). The critics concerning the policy 
priorities of the regional government curiously match those of the mu-
nicipal government level. The Flemish government level is perceived as 
strongly centralistic. Despite all good intentions, such as partnership, in 
reality the autonomy of the local government has not been expanded. 
Moreover, instead of regulations adapted according to the variety of local 
government, uniformity is still at hand. This leaves little room for munici-
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palities and provinces to take their own responsibilities. A complaint that 
is often heard is that Flanders ‘thinks in sectors’, while there is need for 
policy integration. The result is inefficiency.
As mentioned above, the Flemish government has labelled the municipa-
lities as the basic level of democracy and the level closest to its citizens. 
The internal state reform is thereby focused on rescaling the competences 
to the municipalities, and, at the same time, confining the competences 
of the provincial government to a limited list of ground-tied competences, 
such as water management, infrastructure, etc. The latter implies that the 
democratically elected provincial level would no longer include person-
tied competences, such as culture, youth and sports. Furthermore, it is a 
wish of the Flemish government that, in the future, maximally two gover-
nment levels intervene in any given policy field.
When the White Paper was finally released, in April 2011, it became clear 
that the objective of limiting the provincial competences to ground-tied 
elements was respected (Vlaamse Regering, 2011: 117–118). However, 
there remained some possibilities to take up certain person-tied compe-
tences for the provinces, but only very limited. The provinces themselves 
oppose the objective of the Flemish government to make the provincial 
government level responsible for a restricted and ‘closed’ list of ground-
tied competences. In this pursuit, they feel supported by several organiza-
tions of the civil society. At some recent conferences business representa-
tives and representatives of the broad social and cultural sector ‘testified’ 
on the usefulness of the provinces (VVP, 2010).
4. Conclusion
The paper has outlined the process of state reform in Belgium. The history 
of the country confirms that its transformation was based upon an agree-
ment between the two main language groups in Belgium, the Dutch-spea-
king and the French-speaking citizens. Looking at the current discussion, 
however, proves that previous agreements were only temporary, and that 
a final solution (or evolution towards a confederate model) is not for to-
morrow. Different opinions about the future of Belgium and different vi-
ews about the future role of the capital Brussels impede a final (or merely 
another) agreement.
Our attention in the paper has been focused on the Flemish part of the 
country. We examined the (ambitious) plans of the new Flemish Minister 
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of Internal Affairs. In his policy declaration and his Green Paper, the Mi-
nister speaks of an internal Flemish state reform intended to shorten and 
accelerate the policy process. Moreover, he wants to deal with the ‘overlo-
aded’ government by reducing the number of intermediate structures that 
have cropped up over the years. The administrative landscape should be 
made more transparent and, wherever possible, structures that are no lon-
ger functional should be abolished. The Flemish government intends to 
make overlapping between different government levels to strive towards 
as rare as possible. In the ideal situation advocated by the Minister, only 
two tiers of government should remain per policy field.
Furthermore, the Minister has put forward a complete range of measures 
that must help him in the realisation of this plan. In this respect, he wants 
to strengthen the functioning of the local level by giving it both more 
power and more financial means. Consequently, the reform of the mu-
nicipal fund is a priority. The plan to stimulate voluntary amalgamations 
can be welcomed, although it is unclear which municipalities will make 
use of this opportunity. The resistance among local politicians against this 
policy option is significant. Next to that, the Flemish provinces seem to 
be paying a price for this plan. The objective of the Flemish government 
is not to abolish them, but they will certainly look differently after this 
reform has been implemented.
It must be said, the plans of Minister Bourgeois are rather ambitious. The 
success of these plans, however, will depend on the way he can realise 
them. To this end, an extended consultation among all the actors concer-
ned will be necessary. Not only local and provincial politicians but also 
the actors at the Flemish level must play a substantial role in this debate. 
The latter are to a large extent responsible for the complex administrative 
landscape we live in today.
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FlandeRs HeadinG TowaRds iTs  
own sTaTe ReFoRm
summary
Belgian constitution states that ‘Belgium is a federal state, composed of com-
munities and regions’. This is the result of five state reforms (1970, 1980, 1988–
1989, 1993 and 2001). The political power of the country is divided among 
different partners: communities, regions and the federal state. The position of the 
nation-state has weakened as authority has been transferred downwards, to the 
regional level, and upwards, to the european Union. The five successive state 
reforms of the past have not yet resulted in a final satisfactory state architecture 
– the debates about the future form of the country are at the core of the political 
agenda in Belgium. The Flemish and the French-speaking communities have 
different opinions about how to organize the country. The history of state reform 
process has been analyzed briefly in the first part of this paper. The process of 
state reform also had consequences for the local authorities. since 2001, the 
regions (Flanders and the walloon Region) have been responsible for the organi-
sation of local and provincial government. This resulted in a new framework for 
both of the local governments, in Flanders and in the walloon Region. in Flan-
ders, the discussion about the (re)organisation of the local level has continued 
until today. The relation between the local and the regional level is a point par-
ticular of interest. The new Flemish government that came into power in 2009 
announced that it would carry out an ‘internal Flemish state reform’. Thereby 
the government considered a shift of competences between the different govern-
ment levels, a reform of the municipal finances and the promotion of voluntary 
mergers between municipalities. Those initiatives are analysed and placed into 
a broader perspective. The analysis takes into account the questions of what the 
Flemish government is aiming at and why.
Key words: Flemish state reform, local, provincial and regional self-government 
– Belgium, Belgian federalism, the Brussels-Capital Region, Flanders, the wal-
loon Region, amalgamations and mergers of local units, linguistic divide
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FlandRiJa na PUTU PRema  
dRŽaVnoJ ReFoRmi 
sažetak
Belgijski ustav definira da je »Belgija federalna država koja se sastoji od za-
jednica i regija«. To je rezultat pet reformi državnog ustroja (1970., 1980., 
1988.–1989., 1993. i 2001.). Politička moć u državi podijeljena je između 
različitih partnera: između zajednica te između regija i federalne države. Po-
ložaj federacije je slabio usporedno s procesom prijenosa ovlasti naniže, prema 
regionalnoj razini, te prema naviše, prema europskoj uniji. Reforme državnog 
ustroja još nisu rezultirale konačnom i zadovoljavajućom državnom strukturom 
– rasprave o budućem obliku zemlje su u središtu političkog zanimanja u Bel-
giji. Flamanska i francuska zajednica imaju različita mišljenja o tome kako bi 
država trebala biti ustrojena. U prvom dijelu rada ukratko se analizira povijest 
reforme državnog ustroja, koji je utjecao i na lokalne vlasti. Regije (Flandrija i 
Valonija) su od 2001. nadležne za organizaciju lokalne i provincijske razine 
vlasti, što je imalo za posljedicu stvaranje nove pravne regulacije lokalnih vlasti 
i u Flandriji i u Valoniji. U Flandriji se rasprava o re(organizaciji) lokalne 
razine vlasti nastavlja sve do danas. odnos između lokalne i regionalne razine 
od posebnog je interesa. nova flamanska vlada, koja je na vlasti od 2009., na-
javila je da će provesti »unutarnju flamansku državnu reformu«. To se odnosilo 
na prebacivanje nadležnosti između različitih razina vlasti, reformu lokalnih 
financija te promicanje dobrovoljnog spajanja lokalnih jedinica. Te se inicijative 
u radu analiziraju i stavljaju u širu perspektivu. analiza se bavi pitanjima što 
flamanska vlada želi postići i zašto.
Ključne riječi: flamanska državna reforma, lokalna, provincijska i regional-
na samouprava – Belgija, belgijski federalizam, Regija Bruxelles-Glavni grad, 
Flandrija, Valonija, okrupnjavanje i spajanje lokalnih jedinica, jezična podjela

